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M.: Evidence--"Res Gestae"--Spontaneous Exclamations
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
for P's claim that she.has the right to use the information collected by the state for her own personal advantage.
The privilege of state secrets is not so governed by fixed rules
as the attorney-client or husband-wife privilege,' since it is one
which at the discretion of the judge may be disregarded. It appears
to be based chiefly on the need for governmental efficiency and
freedom of action, but if there are other aspects of public interest
in favor of disclosing the information which outweigh the policy
of secrecy, the judge may order that the records be opened to the
petitioner.
A. A. A.
N. E. S.
EvmwcE - "R s GESTAE" SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS.
One morning after parking his car four blocks from his place
of business at 7:20, the decedent, a vigorous man in good health,
entered his office about 7:30, moaning and groaning, apparently
much upset and in pain, stating that he had slipped on the icy
pavement and fallen. Similar statements were made about an hour
later at a near-by store where he had been taken. His wife sued on
an insurance policy, seeking double indemnity, which depended
upon death resulting from bodily injury caused exclusively by
accidental means. The trial court admitted testimony relative to
the decedent's statements in both instances. Held, that testimony as
to the first statement made in his office is admissible as part of
the "res gestae," but the admission of the statement made an
hour later is erroneous Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.'
The term "res gestae" is used by courts generally as an evidentiary device to admit various types of evidence, some coming
within the hearsay rule, others not. 2 The early West Virginia
-

11 Thomas v. First National Bank, 166 Va. 497, 186 S. E. 77 (1936);
Sullivan v. Hill, 73 W. Va. 49, 79 S. E. 670 (1913); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENOE) §§
2332-2341, 2290-2329.
18 S. E. (2d) 825 (W. Va. 1940). The basis for admitting the flrst statement
was that it had been spontaneously uttered while the decedent was still bubject to the nervous excitement of the event which caused his suffering, giving
to his utterance sufficient guaranty of trustworthiness. Admission of the
second statement made an hour later was held to be erroneous because of the
interval of time which had elapsed and the circumstances under which the
statement had been made. However, since it was the same as that made at
the office and merely cumulative, the court did not consider its admission as
prejudicial.
2 6 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1768, 1769, lists five such types
of cases, and two instances in substantive law, where "res gestae" is used
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cases accepted as "a well settled rule that declarations as parts
of res gestae, made at the time of the transaction, are regarded as
verbal acts..."s and included within the general term a variety
of factual situations, such as are categorized by Wigmore and
other writers on the subject. 4 This comment deals only with one
class of evidence admitted under the res gestae doctrine. Where
there is some non-verbal act that is itself admissible under the
issue, the orthodox doctrine of res gestae as constituting an exception to the hearsay rule admitted hearsay statements characterizing and giving color to such act, provided that the statements
and the non-verbal act were contemporaneous.'
While the first cases considering the question required strict
contemporaneity between the act established and the declarations
constituting the res gestae,6 subsequent decisions indicated a
tendency to relax this strictness.1 However, this lack of contemporaneity necessitated some guaranty of trustworthiness of
the hearsay, before it could be admitted as an exception. It was
this factor that gave rise to the new form of the "res gestae" dctrine, as exemplified by the instant case.
Psychologically, an utterance made under the influence of
some exciting cause, being a spontaneous response to an external
shock, is likely to be sufficiently trustworthy to overcome the vices
as the basis for admitting evidence. See Morgan, 1Bes Gestae (1937) 12
WAsH. L. Rav. 91 ("seven classes of cases"); Catteral, Bes Gestae in Virginia (1935) 21 VA. L. Rav. 725 ("a half a dozen different eanings");
Buchanan, Res Gestae-The Judicial Football (1939) 8 KkAw. BAn J. 367
("five general classes of eases").
3Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477, 484 (1868).
4See note 3, supra. Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477 (1868) (declarations made by D while assaulting F, tending to show that D ,tied P's hands
behind him); Thompson v. Updegraff, 3 W. Va. 629 (1869) (on an issue of
the nature of papers destroyed by a testator, his declarations made at the
time as to their character); Ellis v. Dempsey, 4 W. Va. 126 (1870) (on an
issue of jointness of a trespass, a declaration by one of the defendant trespassers as to his purpose and intent in going on the land) ; State v. Abbott,
8 W. Va. 741 (1875) (on an issue of murder, threats made by the deceased
near the time of the killing admitted as part of the res gestae); Reiser v.
Lawrence, 96 W. Va. 82, 123 S.E. 451 (1924) (an unsigned memorandum of
contract, ordinarily inadmissible, if read over, to the party, and assented to by
him, is admissible as part of the res gesta).
See Tardman, Spovtaneous Exclamations v. Bes Gestae (1918) 25 W. VA.

L. Q. 341.

Va.
0Corder v. Talbott, 14 W. Ira. 277 (1878) ; Lawrence v. DuBois, 16 MW.
443 (1880); Williams v. Belmont Coal & Coke Co., 55 W. Va. 84, 46 S.E. 802
(1904) ; 1 GREE-'Lmr, EVIDENCE (11th ed. 1863) 149.
7 State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S.E. 230 (1902) ("These incidents
[the res gesfacl may be separated from the act by a lapse of time more or less
appreciable . .'.");

State v. Baker, 84 W. Va. 151, 99 S. E. 252 (1919)

(need not be precisely concurrent).
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- or what Thayer calls the "curse"" - of hearsay. The recognition which courts generally have accorded to this theory has led
Wigmore to discuss it as a "genuine exception to the hearsay rule,"
which he calls the "Spontaneous Exclamations Doctrine.'"' This
exception includes the following elements: (1) a startling occasion;
(2) a statement made while the declarant is still under the influence of the exciting cause, while his reflective powers are in
abeyance; and (3) the utterance must, perhaps, relate to the
circumstances of the occurrence just preceding it. 0 Jones, on the
other hand, considers this exception as a type of "res gestae,"
using as the test of admissibility substantially the same elements
that Wigmore adopts in his "spontaneous exclamations" doctrine."Whatever terms are used, the indisputable fact is that courts
do admit such evidence, and it is with the limitations of the doctrine ithat we are here concerned. Since the case of Starcher v.
South Penn Oil Co.,' 2 the West Virginia court has regarded "res
gestae" in a new light. The decisions still speak in terms of "res
gestae," but often admit statements that bccur a considerable
time after the act itself, provided that the exciting cause still
exists. 13 Thus, some of the earlier cases refusing to admit the
evidence due to lack of contemporaneity might have held contra
under the present test of admissibility.14 In the principal case the
8 THAYER,

PRELaNARY TEATISE ON EVmENCE

(1898) 523.

9 6 Wiom, EVIDENCE § 1746.
10 Id. at §§ 1750, 1754.
3"1 JONES, EVmENCE (4th ed. 1938) §§ 345, 346.
12 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28 (1918).
This is the first important case
applying the "spontaneous exclamations" theory, indicating a change of
attitude toward the old res gestac limitations.
'3 Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 458, 130 S. E. 810 (1925).
In admitting declarations of a driver of a car, made twenty minutes after an accident, that he was driving 45 miles an hour, the court stated: "This statement
of Young appears to have been a spontaneous, undesigned and illustrative
incident and part of the litigated act. These are the tests of admissibility
under the res gestae rule."
14 Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871)
(on a sub-issue of how the
decedent, had received his wounds, his dying declaration that it was hard "tto
die by the hand of another" held inadmissible as part of the res gestae because it was too remote from the transaction); Hawker v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 15 W. Va. 628 '(1879) (statements of an engineer one hour after hitting
cattle while driving the engine, tending to show negligence on his part, held
inadmissible).
The time when a hearsay statement is made and its relation to the nonverbal act continues to be an important element. ". . . it is an important
fact to be considered in deciding whether a particular statement was a spontaneous one, and consequently part of the res gesta." State v. Johnson, 107
W. Va. 216, 219, 148 S. E. 4 (1929); State v. Hicks, 10T. WV. Va. 418, 148
S. E. 131 (1929) (declarations made by D three or four hours after his alleged
assault on X, professing his friendship for X, held inadmissible. The court
stated that while the element of time is not always controlling in determining
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lapse of time was about ten minutes. Under the old rule requiring
strict contemporaneity, the declarations would not be admissible.
But the court, though speaking in terms of "res gestae," let the
evidence in as a "spontaneous exclamation."
If the use of "res gestae" as a generic term were frankly
abandoned, it would constitute, it is believed, little more than a
clarifying change in form. The case of Reynolds v. Grant Co.'15 represents a step in this commendable direction. "The proper restriction of the term," says the court, "confines it to those declarations which are not only considered to be a part of the thing
done, but which depend for their admission in evidence upon the
fact that the declarant at the time of making the declarations was,
as a consequence of the thing done, under such stress of emotion or
excitement as to render the declarations spontaneous to the point
of being almost involuntary, precluding the reflection that gives
rise to falsehood." 16
J. S. M.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE -

ALImONY

IN ANNULMENT

PRO-

After a ceremonial marriage in Maryland, H and
IV, residents of West Virginia, returned to this state, but never
cohabited as husband and wife. H, an infant, by next of friend,
sued to have a decree entered to annul the marriage. Held, that
although under our statute the court has no jurisdiction to annul
CEEDINGS. -

whether a statement is a part of the res gestae, the particular circumstances
and the mental and physical condition being of considerable importance, it
is often a vital fact in ascertaining whether a declaration is a spontaneous
and contemporaneous one. Here, because of the indefiniteness of time and the
absence of facts and circumstances which might bring the alleged statements
within the hearsay rule, the declarations should not have been admitted). Cf.
State v. MeKinney, 88 W. Va. 400, 106 S. E. 894 (1921) (a statement made
by D several hours after an alleged offense, admitting the act and stating a
motive, held inadmissible, it being no part of the -res gestae.
1 117 W. Va. 615, 186 S. E. 603 (1936) (in excluding remarks of a store
manager made when a customer had slipped and fallen on the floor, that another person had fallen at the same place that morning, because it was not
shown that he himself had seen such person fall, the court stated that this
was no more than "hearsay evidence of hearsay evidenee").
16 Id. at 620. The court's definition continues: "It is thought that in
all instances where such circumstances do not exist, while the declaration in
question may be admissible in evidence either because the hearsay rule does
not properly apply to exclude it or because it comes within some other exception to that rule, it is not, correctly speaking, admitted because it is a part

of the res gestac."

Cf. 1 JoNEs, EvMDeNF. 638: "The judicial trend is towards relaxation of
the rule of absolute and identical contemporaneity and a substitution in its
place of the test of spontaneity and logical relation to the principal event."
See page 638, n. 19, citing cases and law review articles.
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